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Reconciling Conflicts in Illinois Judicial Ethics
Judge Charles F Scott*
I. INTRODUCTION
The federal "Greylord" investigations and prosecutions in Chi-
cago have resulted in numerous convictions of judges, lawyers, and
court personnel in recent years. These investigations and prosecu-
tions provided the backdrop to the adoption of the modified Amer-
ican Bar Association Code of Judicial Conduct (the "ABA
Code")'T in Illinois on January 1, 1987.2 The Illinois Code of Judi-
cial Conduct impacts upon a broad range of conduct and people.
This Article will focus, however, on the innocent or incidental oc-
casions of ethical conflict, and not the criminal or clearly corrupt
conduct.
The primary purpose for this examination of the Illinois Code of
Judicial Conduct (the "Code") 4 is to anticipate limitations upon,
and permissible latitudes for, a judge's conduct on those incidental
occasions of ethical conflict. These parameters inevitably will
spring from interpretations of the Code by those agencies charged
with its enforcement.- A related purpose is to consider how the
Code affects a judge in his judicial, personal, civic, charitable,
political, and other roles. The Committee Commentary to Canon
2, on the appearance of impropriety, tersely sets the tenor of the
Illinois Code: "[The judge] must expect to be the subject of con-
* Circuit Court of Illinois, 19th Judicial Circuit.
1. The Illinois Code of Judicial Conduct is based largely upon the code of judicial
ethics proposed by the American Bar Association in 1972, but contains many
modifications.
2. Although the adoption of the new rules coincided with the Greylord investiga-
tions, the preparation of these new rules began in 1979. ILL. S. CT. RULES 61-68, ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 1 10A, paras. 61-68 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987) (Supplement to Historical
& Practice Notes).
3. This Article does not consider the mechanics of Canon 8 (Supreme Court Rule 68)
dealing with the declaration of economic interests.
4. The Code is set forth in Supreme Court Rules 61-68 found in chapter I10A of the
Illinois Revised Statutes. ILL. S. CT. RULES 61-68, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 10A, paras. 61-
68 (1987).
5. The Judicial Inquiry Board is the investigating and prosecuting authority by virtue
of article 6, section 15(b) of the Constitution of Illinois of 1970. ILL. CONST. art. 6,
§ 15(b). The Courts Commission is the adjudicatory authority by virtue of article 6,
section 15(e) of the Constitution of the State of Illinois of 1970. ILL. CONST. art. 6,
§ 15(e).
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stant public scrutiny. He must therefore accept restrictions on his
conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citi-
zen and should do so freely and willingly." 6 This Article proposes
that the judge examine his relationships or roles with others not
merely in terms of his sensibilities of fair play and appropriate con-
duct, but also by the public's perceptions of that conduct.
II. RELATIONSHIPS WITH ATTORNEYS
Most judges at one time practiced law in the community in
which they serve. Many professional and social relationships inevi-
tably grew out of their legal careers. Particularly in the smaller
communities of Illinois, most lawyers were acquainted with their
judges as fellow practitioners. It is not unusual in such communi-
ties that the comradeship of respectful adversaries continues after
one puts on a black robe. It is difficult for most judges to assume
aloofness and studied separation from their former colleagues.
Often, lawyers join their one time colleagues in chambers singly or
en masse for a cup of coffee, or in a local restaurant for lunch. In
the present Greylord milieu, members of the public may consider
this activity as evidence of fixing cases or engaging in ex parte
communications.
A judge does not become a recluse upon assuming the bench.
His former golf or tennis partners may continue their athletic ac-
tivities with the judge, but may feel somewhat ambivalent about
appearing as advocates in his court. Under Canon 5A, a judge
may "engage in the arts, sports, and other social and recreational
activities, if such avocational activities do not detract from the dig-
nity of his office or interfere with the performance of his judicial
duties."' 8 If the attorney is such a close personal friend that the
judge could not bring himself to rule against him, then under Ca-
non 3C(l)(a) the judge possesses "a personal bias or prejudice" and
6. ILL. S. CT. R. 62, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 62 (1987). Canon 2 corre-
sponds to Supreme Court Rule 62. Similarly, each other canon corresponds to the
Supreme Court Rule that appears with the number 6 preceding the applicable canon
number.
7. An ex parte communication is an oral or written communication between a judge
and another about a pending or impending case (not necessarily his) in the court on
which he serves, when less than all attorneys of record have been notified to be present or
received contemporaneously a copy of the written communication. "Another" may be an
attorney, a party, a witness, a person who is interested in the outcome of the case, a
journalist, a television or radio commentator, a social acquaintance, or, more expansively,
any member of the public. See In re Bonin, 375 Mass. 680, 378 N.E.2d 669 (1978).
8. ILL. S. CT. R. 65A, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. I 10A, para. 65A (1987).
1068 [Vol. 19
Judicial Ethics
should, on his own motion, disqualify himself.9 Moreover, in a
case in which the attorney was his campaign manager, the judge
should disqualify himself because hearing the attorney's cases
would give the appearance of impropriety, even though in thejudge's mind he has no personal bias or prejudice. In such cases,
the judge should disclose the social relationship sua sponte.
It is preferable that the judge disclose before, rather than after,
the trial that he and his family vacation with the prosecutor and
his family. In a Greylord prosecution of an Illinois judge, the so-
cial relationship between the presiding federal judge and the prose-
cutor was argued as a basis for reversal in the Court of Appeals.10
Although the jury's verdict was not set aside, the opinion pointedly
criticized the judge for presiding without first disclosing the rela-
tionship to the defendant. The court concluded, "[A]n objective
observer reasonably would doubt the ability of a judge to act with
utter disinterest and aloofness when he was such a close friend of
the prosecutor that the families of both were just about to take a
joint vacation."' "I
Gifts, loans, and favors to members of the judiciary have become
a major focal point in light of United States v. Holzer.12 A judge
must be very circumspect regarding what he accepts from an attor-
ney. Canon 5C(4) sets the boundaries. Under subparagraph (a), a
judge may accept "an invitation to [him] and his spouse to attend a
bar related function or activity devoted to the improvement of the
law, the legal system, or the administration of justice."1' 3 Although
subparagraph (a) does not specify from whom a judge may accept
such an invitation, it would be prudent that such an invitation be
accepted only from a bar association and not from an individual
attorney who practices before the judge.
The Illinois State Bar Association ("ISBA") concluded that a
bar association may bear the expenses of local judges for bar asso-
ciation activities. 14 The ISBA's opinion states that "[tihe presence
of judges at bar association gatherings, where, presumably, all
members of the association may attend, does not give rise to the
9. ILL. S. CT. R. 63C(l)(a), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. IIOA, para. 63C(1)(a) (1987).
10. United States v. Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518 (7th Cir. 1985).
11. Id. at 1538.
12. 840 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir. 1988) (former judge convicted of extortion in connection
with a scheme to defraud, among others, the State of Illinois, its citizens, and the parties
on the other side of the cases from the lawyers who bribed him, of the right to the admin-
istration of justice by an honest judge).
13. ILL. S. CT. R. 65(C)(4)(a), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 1A, para. 65C(4)(a) (1987).
14. Committee on Professional Ethics, Opinion No. 86-19 (June 17, 1987), reprinted
in 76 ILL. B.J. 758, 758 (1987).
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possibility of undue influence as may be present in private golf-
outings or boat rides."15 The ethics opinion observed that many
diverse bar associations are in existence and that some are plaintiff-
oriented and others are defendant-oriented. The opinion allows
these bar associations to invite the judge to their functions at the
expense of the associations. The opinion stated: "[W]e believe that
full and open exchange of ideas, philosophies and the like between
the lawyers and the judges should be fostered and we further be-
lieve that the bar association's functions are a proper and healthy
forum for these exchanges."' 6 The opinion correctly noted that
"under Canon 5C(4)(a) of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which
became effective in Illinois on January 1, 1987, a judge may accept
an invitation with his or her spouse to attend a bar related function
or activity devoted to the improvement of the law, legal system, or
the administration of justice."1 7
It is undecided whether Canon 5C(4)(a) includes attendance at
bar functions that might at first blush be considered recreational,
such as golf outings, variety shows, and dinner dances. These are
events at which lawyers and judges come together and the conver-
sation inevitably turns to the law. It is doubtful that the bar outing
must include a panel discussion on a legal topic before "the open
exchange of ideas" will come into play.
In another ethics opinion, " the ISBA concluded that it was im-
proper to invite local judges to a law firm golf outing at which
current and prospective clients would be in attendance. The opin-
ion cited Rule 7-110(a) of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which provides that "[a] lawyer shall not give or lend anything of
value to a judge, official, or employee of a tribunal, except that a
lawyer may make a contribution to the campaign fund of a candi-
date for such office."' 9 The opinion noted that "[s]uch rule draws
no distinctions based on the extent of the value given to the judge,
nor, except in the instance of campaign contributions, the purpose
for which the value is given."'20
The ISBA's opinion on golf outings is in accord with the spirit of
Canon 5C(4)(c), which prohibits the judge or members of his fam-
15. Id.
16. Id. at 759.
17. Id.
18. Committee on Professional Ethics, Opinion No. 86-18 (July 17, 1987), reprinted
in 76 ILL. B.J. 758 (1987).
19. Id. (quoting CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrry Rule 7-110(a), ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. I OA, CANON 7 (1987)).
20. Opinion No. 86-8, reprinted in 76 ILL. B.J. at 758.
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ily from receiving "any other gift, bequest, favor, or loan" from
"lawyers who practice or have practiced before the judge. ' 21 It
would seem that the judge's attendance at such a private firm's golf
outing, attended by present and prospective clients, also violates
Canon 2B, which states that "[a judge] should not lend the prestige
of his office to advance the private interests of others; nor should
he convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are
in a special position to influence him."'22
The judge's attendance at the golf outing permits others to con-
vey the impression that they are in a special position to influence
the judge. In such a situation, the judge is window dressing for the
law firm to impress its present clients and to gain new ones. The
implication is that this is the law firm's judge.
III. GiFrs, FAVORS AND ASSOCIATIONS
Under 5C(4)(b), "a judge or a member of his family residing in
his household may accept ordinary social hospitality. ' 23 It would
seem that hospitality, in the form of coffee, perhaps even accompa-
nied by a roll, would be acceptable. A lavish dinner, however,
from one who practices in front of a judge would be unacceptable.
It also would seem that under subparagraph (b), the judge or a
member of his family residing in his household may accept "a wed-
ding or engagement gift" from such an attorney.24
Subparagraph (c) states that "a judge or a member of his family
residing in his household may accept any other gift, bequest, favor,
or loan . . . [but not from] lawyers who practice or have practiced
before the judge. ' 25 It appears that the use of the words "any
other" in subparagraph (c) permits the judge to accept ordinary
social hospitality from an attorney who practices in front of him,
or, to accept a wedding or engagement gift under subparagraph
(b). The judge may not accept any other gift, bequest, favor or
loan from lawyers who practice or have practiced before him.
21. ILL. S. Cr. R. 65C(4)(c), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. l10A, para. 65C(4)(c) (1987).
22. ILL. S. CT. R. 62B, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 62B (1987).
23. ILL. S. Cr. R. 65C(4)(b), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 65C(4)(b) (1987).
24. Id. Even though a judge or a member of his family may accept a wedding or
engagement gift under Canon 5C(4)(b), it must be disclosed in the statement of economic
interests under Canon 8 if it is in "excess of $100." ILL. S. CT. R. 68, ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 1 10A, para. 68 (1987).
25. ILL. S. Cr. R. 65C(4)(c), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 10A, para. 65C(4)(c) (1987). Ca-
non 5C(4)(b) allows a judge or member of his family to accept "a loan from a lending
institution in its regular course of business on the same ternis generally available to per-
sons who are not judges." ILL. S. Cr. R. 65C(4)(b), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para.
65C(4)(b) (1987).
1988] 1071
1072 Loyola University Law Journal [Vol. 19
Very recently, the Illinois Supreme Court considered the propriety
of attorneys' gifts and loans to judges in In re Corboy.26
That circuit, appellate, and supreme court judges are elected and
must conduct campaigns in Illinois presents a dichotomy under the
Code. A prohibition against receiving gifts from lawyers rests un-
easily alongside the fact that a judge's campaign committee may
solicit campaign funds under Canon 7B(2). The latter provision
does not prohibit solicitation of funds from lawyers who practice in
front of the judge. The judge, however, may not solicit any cam-
paign funds personally; any campaign contribution is to the judge's
campaign fund and not to him. Although this distinction legally is
tenable, the public perception of that distinction is not sympa-
thetic. If a judge attends his campaign function, he is sure to see
the attorney contributors in attendance. He is likely to see few
others, because few others contribute to judicial campaigns.
Herein lies the uneasy tension between the goals of the Code and
the realities of an elected judiciary.
The prohibition against receiving gifts from lawyers who prac-
tice or have practiced in front of the judge is not limited to mone-
tary gifts. The judge under Canon 5C(4)(c) may not accept a
26. In In re Corboy, et al, No. 65609 (I11. S. Ct. June 22, 1988), attorneys who gave
one thousand dollar gifts or loans to pay a judge's mother's hospital bills and loans to pay
the judge's taxes were found to be in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Because of the newness of the ethical provisions, however, the attorneys were not disci-
plined. The Illinois Supreme Court held that a charitable, compassionate, or other inno-
cent intent when making the gift does not exonorate the attorney donor. The court
stated, "Attorney gifts or loans to judges, even if well-intentioned, are simply too suscep-
tible to abuse, and too prone to creating an appearance of impropriety." Slip op. at 5.
The court found that the gifts could not be construed as "ordinary social hospitality,"
and that the "transactions [were] a far cry from the social dinners, gratuitous rides, birth-
day recognitions and gifts of books or flowers, which might be genuine instances of social
hospitality . . . ." Id. at 9.
Importantly, the court found the fact that the attorneys did not practice before the
judge was no defense because "a judge is not a permanent fixture of any division, but is
subject to reassignment by the chief judge." Id. The court enunciated the following test
to determine whether a gift is "ordinary social hospitality":
We believe that ordinary social hospitality consists of those routine amenities,
favors, and courtesies which are normally exchanged between friends and ac-
quaintances, and which would not create an appearance of impropriety to a
reasonable, objective observer. The test is objective, rather than subjective, and
the touchstone is a careful consideration of social custom. While we cannot
draw any bright lines, we believe that the following factors should be taken into
account: (1) the monetary value of the gift, (2) the relationship, if any, between
the judge and the donor/lender lawyer, (3) the social practices and customs
associated with gifts and loans, and (4) the particular circumstances suriound-
ing the gifts and loans.
Id. at 8.
27. II. S. Ct. R. 67B(2), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 10A, para. 67B(2) (1987).
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"favor" from a lawyer who has practiced or is practicing in front of
the judge.28 Consequently, he may not accept favors such as a law-
yer friend calling the bank to secure a lower mortgage rate, the
attorney arranging a free meal at the attorney's country club, or
the attorney calling the local car dealer to get a special discount on
the purchase of a car. It is questionable under subparagraph (c)
whether the attorney may write a letter of recommendation for the
judge's child to attend college.
Perhaps a rule of reason will develop that the writing of a letter
of recommendation is a common courtesy among people who are
not judges and lawyers and, therefore, that type offavor is not pro-
scribed because the student's parent happens to be a judge and his
friend happens to be a lawyer who practices before the judge. In
the course of common activities among people, a letter of recom-
mendation between friends or acquaintances is not considered a
favor that would corrupt and despoil the judiciary.
It likewise can be argued that a judge may not write a letter of
recommendation for an attorney friend or for his child. Under Ca-
non 2B, the judge "should not lend the prestige of his office to
advance the private interest of others."29 It seems clear under that
provision that a judge may not write a letter recommending that a
client employ an attorney. Under the same rule, the judge should
not "convey or permit others to convey the impression that they
are in a special position to influence him."' 30 Hopefully, a letter of
recommendation from a judge for an attorney's child to attend col-
lege would be viewed under a rule of reason.
Also under Canon 2, the judge "should not testify voluntarily as
a character witness. ' 31 Consequently, an attorney friend or ac-
quaintance necessarily would have to subpoena the judge before he
could testify as a character witness on the attorney's behalf. This
also applies in the case of non-lawyers.
Under Canon 5C(l) the judge "should refrain from financial and
business dealings" that "involve him in frequent transactions with
lawyers or persons likely to come before the court on which he
serves."32 The judge "may hold and manage investments, includ-
ing real estate," under Canon 5C(2).33 He should, however, avoid
being a member of a stock purchasing club or group of investors
28. ILL. S. CT. R. 65C(4)(c), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 65C(4)(c) (1987).
29. ILL. S. CT. R. 62B, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 62B (1987).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. ILL. S. CT. R. 65C(1), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. IlOA, para. 65C(1) (1987).
33. ILL. S. CT. R. 65C(2), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I IOA, para. 65C(2) (1987).
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buying real estate when the activities involve a lawyer "likely to
come before the court on which he serves."'3 4 That phrase in Ca-
non 5C(l) is more restrictive than "lawyers who practice or have
practiced before the judge.""
In Canon 5C(6), the Code contains an insider provision similar
to § 16(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.36 Canon
5C(6) provides that "[i]nformation acquired by a judge in. his judi-
cial capacity should not be used or disclosed by him in financial
dealings or for any other purpose not related to his judicial du-
ties."'37 Consequently, a judge hearing a public trial concerning fi-
nancial matters may not buy or sell involved securities or tell
friends about them. Members of the public, who hear the proceed-
ing, however, may act in their own personal interests.
IV. Ex PARTE COMMUNICATIONS
Canon 3A(4) states in part that a judge "shall not permit ex
parte or other communications concerning a pending or impending
proceeding. ' 38 This rule would seem to indicate that a judge may
speak about a case only when all attorneys in a case are present.
On its face, the rule would prohibit a judge from scheduling a pre-
trial or other matter by speaking with less than all attorneys by
phone or in other casual fashion. It certainly prohibits the judge
from discussing the case with parties or witnesses unless all parties
are represented.
It might be advisable that the judge never accept a phone call
directly. Perhaps, courtroom personnel always should answer the
phone and ask the caller his business. Once the judge picks up the
phone, it may be too late to avoid receiving an ex parte communi-
cation from an attorney, witness, party, juror, or concerned person.
Illinois case law indicates that a judge's ex parte communica-
tions are not per se prejudicial. The Illinois Supreme Court found
in a criminal prosecution that the judge's ex parte communication
with a prospective witness did not require reversal of a convic-
tion.39 The court stated, "To say that any involuntary meeting or
34. ILL. S. CT. R. 65C(l), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 1A, para. 65C(1) (1987).
35. Compare ILL. S. CT. R. 65C(1), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I10A, para. 65C(l) (1987)
with ILL. S. CT. R. 65C(4)(c), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 65C(4)(c) (1987).
36. 48 Stat. 896, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78(p) (1982).
37. ILL. S. CT. R. 65C(6), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 65C(6) (1987).
38. ILL. S. CT. R. 63A(4), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 10A, para. 63A(4) (1987).
39. People v. Hicks, 44 Ill. 2d 550, 256 N.E.2d 823, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 845 (1970).
The judge had an ex parte communication with a prospective State's witness who
wandered into his chambers. The individual objected on the record to a continuance of
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conversation, no matter how trivial, gives rise to cause for disquali-
fication would present too easy a weapon with which to harass the
administration of criminal justice and to obtain a substitution of
judges." 4° In another case, a judge's receiving ex parte a memoran-
dum of law in chambers from a prosecutor, who was in the pres-
ence of an FBI agent, was insufficient to reverse the judge's denial
of a motion for substitution of judge.41
In one sentencing matter, the judge discussed his views about the
defendant with an attorney who was not involved in the case.42 He
indicated that he believed the State was sorry it recommended pro-
bation.43 The judge sentenced the defendant to penitentiary time.
The judge's refusal to allow the defendant to withdraw his guilty
plea was affirmed on appeal.4 In a contrasting case, however, a
sentence was reversed on appeal because the sentencing judge had
various ex parte communications in which he solicited opinions of
non-judges about what the sentence should be.45 The case was re-
manded with instructions that resentencing be done by another
judge.46
In many criminal courts, a judge is assigned one state's attorney
and one public defender. Under these circumstances, the judge in-
evitably will find himself alone with the prosecutor or public de-
fender. Accordingly, at the outset of the relationships, the judge
should let it be known in unequivocal terms, that he will not dis-
cuss any case in any way, including scheduling, unless both attor-
neys are present.
Under the unmodified ABA Code, a judge may confer with a
law professor regarding a pending case so long as the judge gives
the trial before entering the judge's chambers. The judge disclosed that the witness asked
whether she might sit in the front portion of the courtroom. Id. at 555-56, 256 N.E.2d at
826. The defendant's motion for substitution of judge was denied without sending the
matter to another judge. The court held that "the judge's conversations . . . . one of
which was in open court, did not give cause for his disqualification, or give rise either to
unfairness or a probability of unfairness which fatally infected the trial." Id. at 556, 256
N.E.2d at 827.
40. Id.
41. People v. Dunigan, 96 I11. App. 3d 799, 421 N.E.2d 1319 (1st Dist. 1981).
42. People v. Horstman, 103 I11. App. 3d 17, 23, 430 N.E.2d 523, 528 (5th Dist.
1981).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. People v. Sumner, 40 Ill. App. 3d 832, 838, 354 N.E.2d 18, 23 (4th Dist. 1976).
46. Id. at 839, 354 N.E.2d at 24. It should be noted that the foregoing cases consid-
ered the effects of the ex parte communications upon criminal defendants' rights. They
do not necessarily indicate like results in disciplinary hearings before the Illinois Courts
Commission.
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notice to the parties involved and gives them an opportunity to
respond.47 Under the Illinois Code, a judge may not have such a
conference with a law professor.48
Although the rule does not state what should be done after an ex
parte communication has been made or attempted, the spirit of the
Committee Commentary indicates that there should be disclosure
to the other attorneys involved in the case. There is nothing spe-
cific under Canon 3C that would require recusal or disqualification
after an ex parte communication has been made. Under Canon
3C(l)(a), however, a judge would have to disqualify himself if the
communication gave him "personal knowledge of disputed eviden-
tiary facts concerning the proceeding." '49 For that type of disquali-
fication there cannot be any remittal of disqualification under
Canon 3D and the judge would have to disqualify and recuse him-
self permanently. If someone merely engaged in hyperbole or
made bizarre accusations, the judge would not necessarily have to
recuse himself unless he believed the statements and, therefore, had
a "personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or his lawyer." 50
Such a personal bias or prejudice under 3C(l)(a) cannot be cured
by a remittal of disqualification under 3D. If the ex parte commu-
nication was made under other circumstances in which the judge's
"impartiality might reasonably be questioned," the judge might
consider whether he should disqualify himself though there is no
specified ground of disqualification under Canon 3C. That canon
requires disqualification when the judge's "impartiality might rea-
sonably be questioned, including but not limited to . . ." specific
grounds under subparagraphs (a) through (e). 51 Thus, when decid-
ing whether to disqualify himself, the judge should consider the
public's perception of the circumstances that might call his impar-
tiality into question. This means that the judge should reach be-
yond his personal feelings regarding whether he can continue to be
impartial and should look to more external considerations in tune
with the spirit and climate of the times.
When a judge is at a social function, it should be anticipated that
friends and acquaintances may discuss a media item about a case
that the judge is handling. The judge should firmly but politely
advise that he cannot discuss the case because it is pending before
47. ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3A(4) (1988).
48. See generally ILL. S. CT. R. 63A(4), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 63A(4)
committee comments (Smith-Hurd 1987).
49. ILL. S. Cr. R. 63C(1)(a), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 63C(b)(a) (1987).
50. Id.
51. ILL. S. CT. R. 63C(1), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. IlOA, para. 63C(1) (1987).
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him. 2 Here is an instance where the concern is not only what
others might necessarily say to him, but also what he might say to
them. The judge's most neutral remarks about the case might be
conveyed to the parties, their attorneys, or the media and result in
an impression that the judge is prejudiced.
One shortcoming of Canon 3A(4) is that it does not differentiate
between innocent and culpable ex parte communications. A ran-
dom remark by a social acquaintance that he has read or heard
about a case pending before the judge would not be viewed as sus-
pect by a reasonable person when the communicator has no con-
nection or personal interest in the outcome of the case, the purpose
of the communication was not intended to establish the communi-
cator's position with the judge, and the circumstances or setting of
the communication does not reasonably convey a design to influ-
ence the judge.
In a pre-Code decision by the Illinois Courts Commission, a
judge was suspended for one month for an ex parte discussion in
chambers with the defendant's attorney, regarding a pending crim-
inal case and its possible disposition. Though the judge rejected an
envelope left with the bailiff by the attorney, the Courts Commis-
sion disciplined the judge and stated: "The respondent did not re-
port the incident to 'any authority' even though he assumed [the
attorney] was offering something in return for an anticipated ruling
in favor of [the attorney's] client."5 3 It is sufficient under the pres-
ent Code's Canon 3B that the judge "take or initiate appropriate
disciplinary measures. ' '1 4
Canon 3A(6) states that "[a] judge should abstain from public
comment about a pending or impending proceeding in any
court... ." Consequently, Judge Bonin, the Chief Judge of the
Superior Court in Massachusetts, was disciplined for attending a
52. In Rehnquist, Sense and Nonsense about Judicial Ethics, 28 REc. A.B. CiTY N.Y.
694 (1973) [hereinafter Rehnquist], Associate Justice William H. Rehnquist attended a
dinner party at which guests discussed the then very topical Watergate. One of the par-
ticipants suggested the discussion stop because Justice Rehnquist might rule in Watergate
matters. Justice Rehnquist's reaction was as follows:
I thanked him for his considerition, but added that if listening to this conversa-
tion were to render me damaged goods for the purpose of adjudication, it was at
most harmless error in view of the damage I had already sustained by being
exposed to the daily newspapers and television news programs.
Id. at 711.
53. In re Laurie, 2 11. Cts. Comm'n 91, 94 (1985).
54. ILL. S. CT. R. 63B(3), ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 63B(3) (1987).
55. ILL. S. CT. R. 63A(6), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 63A(6) (1987) (emphasis
added).
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lecture by Gore Vidal that was for the benefit of certain homosex-
ual defendants in criminal cases pending before the Superior Court,
but not before Judge Bonin.56 A Boston newspaper carried on its
front page a photo of Judge Bonin and Mr. Vidal taken after the
program. The photo was accompanied by a headline reading,
"Bonin at benefit for sex defendants. ' 57 The Massachusetts
Supreme Court found that" [b]y his attendance at the meeting the
Chief Justice not only exposed himself to ex parte or one-sided
statements and argumentation on matters before his court, but fur-
ther compromised his position by seeming to favor or to have par-
ticular sympathy with the views of the partisan group which
sponsored the affair.""8 It should be noted that Judge Bonin
neither made statements about the pending charges nor gave any
related opinions about homosexuality. The Massachusetts
Supreme Court stated:
The special factor or difficulty in the present case - the stone of
stumbling - which did call for caution was that the Chief Justice
had good reason to infer that the particular meeting would
trench on matters pending in his court; and so it did in fact. That
called for a measure of abstention on his part. 9
The Bonin decision appears to elevate the possibility of making
an ex parte statement to the level of having made one. It would
seem that an "appearance of impropriety" was given particular
weight in the absence of any discernible violations of any other
canon. Though Judge Bonin made no ex parte statements, the
Massachusetts Supreme Court warned, "A judge must distance
himself from pending and impending cases by taking reasonable
precautions to avoid extrajudicial contact with them. ' '60
A judge is ethically responsible for the conduct of his staff.
Under Canon 3A on adjudicative responsibilities, the judge
"should require similar abstention [from ex parte communications]
on the part of court personnel subject to his direction and con-
trol."' 6' Under Canon 3B(2) on administrative responsibilities, "[a]
judge should require his staff and court officials subject to his direc-
tion and control to observe the standards of fidelity and diligence
that apply to him."'62
56. In re Bonin, 375 Mass. 680, 378 N.E.2d 669 (1978).
57. Id. at 701, 378 N.E.2d at 680.
58. Id. at 707, 378 N.E.2d at 683.
59. Id. at 708, 378 N.E.2d at 683.
60. Id. at 706-07, 378 N.E.2d at 682.
61. ILL. S. CT. R. 63A(6), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 A, para. 63A(6) (1987).
62. ILL. S. Cr. R. 63B(2), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 1OA para. 63B(2) (1987).
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V. DISQUALIFICATION
A judge must disqualify himself from future participation in a
case under circumstances set forth in Canons 3C(1)(a) and (b). No
action of the attorneys or parties can empower him to resume hear-
ing the case after he discloses facts under subparagraph (a) or (b).
If the item of disqualification is found under Canons 3C(1)(c), (d),
or (e), the judge also must disclose the factual basis to the parties.
In such cases, he may resume hearing the case if a remittal of dis-
qualification under Canon 3D is signed by all the parties and law-
yers, "independently of the judge's participation. '63
Subparagraph (a) pertains when the judge "has a personal bias
or prejudice concerning a party or his lawyer, or personal knowl-
edge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding. ' ' 4
Subparagraph (b) applies when he has "served as lawyer in the
matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom he previously prac-
ticed law served during such association as a lawyer concerning the
matter, or the judge or such lawyer has been a material witness
concerning it."' 65 There is no requirement under subparagraph (b)
that the associated lawyer be handling the case at the same time it
comes before the judge or that the judge know the facts of the case.
It probably is wise for a recently installed judge to leaf through his
court files to note attorney appearances, including withdrawn
appearances.
A waivable ground of disqualification under subparagraph (c)
exists if, within the last three years, the judge has associated in
private practice with a firm or a lawyer currently representing any
party in the controversy. When the Code first went into effect Jan-
uary 1, 1987, the requirement was five years. This was reduced to
three years as a practical consideration for small counties in which
the bar is small and the likelihood of association with lawyers who
practice before the judge is greater.
Interestingly, under subparagraph (d), the disqualification aris-
ing from the judge's or his family member's having "a substantial
financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party
to the proceeding" may be waived under remittal of disqualifica-
tion.66 Under subparagraph (e), "a person within the third degree
of relationship" to the judge or spouse may continue as a party or
an attorney in a proceeding before the judge if there is a written
63. ILL. S. CT. R. 63D, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 63D (1987).
64. ILL. S. CT. R. 63C(1)(a), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 10A, para. 63C(1)(a) (1987).
65. ILL. S. Cr. R. 63C(l)(b), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I10A, para. 63C(1)(b) (1987).
66. ILL. S. CT. R. 63C(1)(d), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I10A, para. 63C(1Xd) (1987).
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remittal of disqualification."'
Under Canon 3C(l)(a) through (e) there is no express require-
ment that a judge recuse himself because the attorney or litigant
before him is a friend. Nor is there any specific requirement that
the judge even disclose that fact. Nonetheless, the items of disqual-
ification under subparagraphs (a) through (e) are not exhaustive.
Those subparagraphs are preceded by the catchall statement, "A
judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impar-
tiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to
instances where.... "68 It seems clear that a close friend relation-
ship should be raised by the judge to parties and attorneys who
have no knowledge of it, even though it is not specifically required
by Canon 3.
The test of the canon seems not to leave the decision of disclo-
sure and disqualification to the subjective fairness of the judge. Ca-
non 3C appears to impose a test employing the public's perception
of the information to determine "what reasonably might be ques-
tioned." In United States v. Holzer,69 the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals discussed the issue of whether material information fraud-
ulently was withheld by the judge in a federal mail fraud prosecu-
tion70 and stated: "A judge need not disclose information that
would not make a reasonable person think him incapable of presid-
ing impartially in the case. ' '7 1
The inescapable converse is that a judge must disclose informa-
tion that would make a reasonable person think him incapable of
presiding impartially. The prudent course is to disclose such infor-
mation, even though it is not required by subparagraphs (a)
through (e) of Canon 3C. Once the information that would "make
a reasonable person think [the judge] incapable of presiding impar-
tially" is disclosed, the judge should not resume hearing the case, if
at all, until a written remittal of disqualifications is received.
67. ILL. S. CT. R. 63C(lXe), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 63C(1)(e) (1987).
68. ILL. S. CT. R. 63C(1), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 63C(1) (1987) (emphasis
added).
69. 816 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1987).
70. The Holzer decision followed the long established test that the prosecution in a
mail fraud case need only show a loss of "intangible rights" to good government as a
consequence of the fraudulent conduct. Id. at 310. The "intangible rights" test was re-
jected by the United States Supreme Court in McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2873
(1987), which required a showing of loss of "money or property." 55 U.S.L.W. at 5014.
In a memorandum decision, the United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment in
Holzer and remanded the case to the Seventh Circuit for further consideration in light of
McNally. See United States v. Holzer, 108 S. Ct. 53-54 (1987).
71. Holzer, 816 F.2d at 307.
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It is assumed," though not by any means established, that a re-
mittal of disqualification applies to nonspecified grounds for dis-
qualification, or grounds found in the nebulous "including but not
limited to" language for disqualification in Canon 3C. This as-
sumption is made notwithstanding the limited reference in Canon
3D that remittal of disclosure applies to "Canon 3C(1)(c), Canon
3C(l)(d) or Canon 3C(l)(e) .... ",' This is another way of stating
that the specified grounds of disqualification in Canon 3C(l)(a)
and Canon 3C(l)(b) were being singled out as not being waivable
by a remittal of disqualification. It would appear that omission of
the nonspecific grounds for disqualification from Canon 3D was
inadvertent.
VI. REMITTAL OF DISQUALIFICATION
The remittal of disqualification under Canon 3D must set forth,
in writing, the basis of the disqualification and must be signed by
all "parties and lawyers." The agreement of the parties and attor-
neys must be made "independently of the judge's participa-
tion... . "' Accordingly, the judge may not require or encourage
any agreement that "the judge's relationship or interest is immate-
rial, the judge is no longer disqualified, and may participate in the
proceeding."7  Given the increased frequency of disqualification
scenarios, especially in small counties, it is hoped that a judge may
provide the remittal of disqualification forms to the parties and at-
torneys after they have agreed, and not be guilty of violating the
provision requiring "independ[ence] from the judge's
participation."
When the attorneys indicate that their clients will sign the remit-
tal of disqualification form but presently are unavailable, the Com-
mittee Commentary indicates, "[T]he judge, without violating this
section, may proceed on the written assurance of the lawyer that
72. Some lecturers on Ethics at the Illinois Judicial Conference, September 3-5, 1987,
including your writer, believed the authors of the Code must have intended for there to be
a procedure by which nonspecified grounds for disqualification could be waived. The
obvious available procedure lies within Canon 3D. See ILL. S. Cr. R. 63D, ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 63D (1987).
73. ILL. S. CT. R. 63D, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 10A, para. 63D (1987). The Commit-
tee Commentary to Canon 3D makes no mention whether remittal of disqualification is
available for nonspecified grounds for disqualification in Canon 3C. See ILL. S. C". R.
63D, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 63D committee commentary (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1987).
74. ILL. S. Cr. R. 63D, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 63D (1987).
75. Id.
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his party's consent will be subsequently filed."'7 6 Required practice
is to reserve ruling until the remittal of disqualification, signed by
the clients, is received. The judge may not make a decision while
he is disqualified. He does not become qualified until all attorneys
and parties sign a remittal of disqualification, which states that
"the judge is no longer disqualified." If a remittal of disqualifica-
tion is not received in a reasonable time, the judge should sign an
order recusing himself and sending the case to the Chief Judge for
reassignment.
There is one specific exception to remittal of disqualification pro-
cedure under Canon 3D, that of an insubstantial existing or poten-
tial financial interest of the judge or his family. The canon reads
that "the judge shall make a disclosure of such interest to the par-
ties . . . ." This writer believes such a disclosure should be made
to "the parties," as the canon requires, and not merely to their
attorneys. Moreover, the disclosure should be memorialized for-
mally in the court record. Once the disclosure is made, the judge
"may either choose to participate in the proceeding or state his
intent to so participate in the absence of written objections filed by
any party within 10 days of the disclosure and the statement of the
intent to participate. ' 78 Though the permissive word "may" is
used and the statement is in the disjunctive, conservative practice
would be to employ the ten day procedure.
Canon 3 disqualifications may work hardship upon the attorneys
and parties. A disqualification may require in the case of a small
county that they travel a great distance outside of their county to
have even perfunctory matters heard. Notwithstanding such hard-
ship, it should not deter a judge from doing what ethically is re-
quired. Error, if any, should be made on the side of disclosing too
frequently.
VII. THE JUDGES'S RIGHT TO WITHDRAW
Canon 3D does not require that the judge give the parties and
attorneys the option to keep him in the case when he feels com-
pelled to recuse himself. The procedure is one "of withdrawing
from the proceeding." If the judge believes he should withdraw, he
may do so on his own motion. The judge should then feel no
vested interest or duty to hear the case. If the judge has a serious
76. ILL. S. CT. R. 63D, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 63D committee comments
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987) (emphasis added).
77. ILL. S. CT. R. 63D, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 63D (1987).
78. Id.
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ethical question whether he should continue with the case, the ap-
propriate answer often is that he should withdraw.
A judge should disqualify himself when he questions his own
ability to be fair or believes that non-recusal will raise a serious
appearance of impropriety; a judge, however, should not search for
ways to disqualify himself from a case as a matter of convenience.
The buck must stop with an upright judge who will decide difficult
and controversial cases without fear of political, professional, or
media criticism. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist put it very
well in a speech before the American Bar Association in 1973:
During my sixteen years of the private practice of law, the judge
who was the most 'sensitive' to the 'appearance of impropriety' of
any I knew sat in a court of general jurisdiction in the state where
I practiced. He was so 'sensitive' to the appearance of impropri-
ety that if he had so much as shaken hands at a large political
gathering with one of the litigants who appeared before him, he
would summarily disqualify himself. The principal result of this
'sensitivity' on his part, so far as I could see, was that at least one
working day a week he was able to reach the first tee of the golf
course before eleven o'clock in the morning, or else get home and
do some of those odd jobs which escape the attention of all of us
on the weekends.79
VIII. CONDUCT ON THE BENCH
Two Illinois Courts Commission cases illustrate that a judge
should not use the court as a forum for personal opinions on so-
cially sensitive matters. In one case, the judge told a pregnant at-
torney that "ladies should not be lawyers" and "do not belong in
court."80 He stated, "[N]o industry would allow you to work in
the condition you are in," ' and added, "[I]f your husband had
kept his hands in his pockets you would not be in the condition
you are in. ' The judge was reprimanded for violating what now
is governed by Canon 3A(3). 83 This canon requires that "[a] judge
should be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors, wit-
nesses, lawyers, and others with whom he deals in his official
capacity ....- '
79. Rehnquist, supra note 52, at 712-13.
80. In re Cieslik, 2 I1. Cts. Comm'n 211, 111 (1987).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. ILL. S. Cr. R. 63A(3), ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 63A(3) (1987).
84. Id.
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In another matter,85 the judge was charged with using obscene
language in vividly describing to juveniles the sexual atrocities
awaiting them at the Juvenile Department of Corrections. Some of
the descriptions portrayed the sexual transgressors as members of
an ethnic minority group. The Courts Commission dismissed the
petition and stated that "[v]iewed in the context in which the lan-
guage was used and the purpose for which it was used, we cannot
find that the respondent violated any Supreme Court rules." 86 The
Courts Commission stated that the evidence did not rise to the req-
uisite clear and convincing standard. The Courts Commission,
however, made the following admonition: "We do not approve of
the respondent's selection of language at issue and will not look
favorably upon any future use of such language. "87
IX. WHISTLE BLOWING
Under Canon 3B(3) "[a] judge having knowledge of a violation
of these canons . . . or a violation of Rule 1-102 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility on the part of a lawyer shall take or
initiate appropriate disciplinary measures."8' 8 This does not mean
that he necessarily must make a report to the Judicial Inquiry
Board or to the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commis-
sion. In the case of an errant lawyer, bringing the unlawyer-like
courtroom conduct to the lawyer's attention in private may be suf-
ficient. Reporting such conduct to the chief judge also may be suf-
ficient and may provide a procedure to assist in determining
whether the violations are repetitive.
There is no doubt that being offered a bribe by an attorney re-
quires decisive action under Canon 3B(3). The Illinois Courts
Commission has disciplined a judge when the judge assumed that
the attorney "was offering something in return for an anticipated
ruling" and "did not report the incident to any authority'" under
the previous Code.8 9 There also is no doubt that a judge who sees
and hears a bribe being accepted by another judge has "knowl-
edge" of a violation and must report it under the mandatory provi-
85. In re Teschner, 2 I1. Cts. Comm'n 43 (1983).
86. Id. at 61.
87. Id. at 60.
88. ILL. S. Cr. R. 63B(3), ILL. REv. STAT. ch. I 10A, para. 63B(3) (1987).
89. In re Laurie, 2 Ill. Cts. Comm'n 91, 94 (1985). The present Code does not require
reporting to "the proper authorities," as did former Supreme Court Rule 61(c)(10). The
present Canon 3B(3) requires the judge to "take or initiate appropriate disciplinary meas-
ures." ILL. S. Cr. R. 63B(3), ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 63B(3) (1987).
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sion of Canon 3B(3). Mere suspicion or surmise, however, does
not rise to the level of "knowledge."
X. SEXUAL TRANSGRESSIONS
There is a division of authority as to whether a judge may be
disciplined for sexual transgressions if they do not violate the law.
The Ohio Supreme Court disciplined a judge who "while still mar-
ried to, but separated from, his first wife, took his girl-friend' (now
his second wife) with him, at his expense, on the trip to Majorca
and on the two trips to Mexico ... ."9 The Ohio Supreme Court
did not find persuasive the fact that the judge's conduct was no
different from that of the "ordinary person" and was not unlawful.
The court concluded that "[i]mproper conduct which may be over-
looked when committed by the ordinary person, or even a lawyer,
cannot be overlooked when committed by a judge."91 It should be
noted that the standard that was applied was that the judge's con-
duct be "beyond reproach." That phrase is not in the present Illi-
nois Code.
The Florida Supreme Court reached substantially the same re-
sult in disciplining a judge for engaging in "sexual activities with a
member of the opposite sex not his wife in a parked automo-
bile .... On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania did not discipline a judge for engaging in an extramarital
affair that involved overnight trips and a one week vacation in Pu-
erto Rico.93 The court noted that neither adultery nor fornication
constituted a crime in Pennsylvania and that therefore there was
no basis for discipline "regardless of the private views" of the
court.
94
In Geiler v. Comm'n on Judicial Qualifications,95 the California
Supreme Court removed a judge from office on the basis of his
"crude and offensive conduct in public places."' 96 The judge reput-
90. Cincinnati Bar Ass'n v. Heitzler, 32 Ohio St. 2d 214, 221, 291 N.E.2d 477, 482
(1972). See generally Lubet, Judicial Ethics and Private Lives, 79 Nw. U.L. REv. 983
(1985) [hereinafter Lubet, Judicial Ethics]. See also Lubet, Beyond Reproach; Ethical
Restrictions on the Extrajudicial Activities of State and Federal Judges, AM. JUDICATURE
SoCIETY REP. 39 [hereinafter Lubet, Beyond Reproach]. The foregoing articles are used
in this author's discussion of Sexual Transgressions.
91. Lubet, Beyond Reproach, supra note 90, at 39 (quoting Cincinnati Bar Ass'n, 32
Ohio St. 2d at 221, 291 N.E.2d at 482).
92. In re Inquiry of Lee, 336 So. 2d 1175, 1176 (Fla. 1976).
93. In re Dalessandro, 483 Pa. 431, 456-57, 397 A.2d 743, 755-56 (1979).
94. Id. at 462, 397 A.2d at 758.
95. 10 Cal. 3d 270, 515 P.2d 1, 110 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1973).
96. Id. at 274, 515 P.2d at 3, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 203.
1988] 1085
Loyola University Law Journal
edly had used vulgar language, made offensive sexual gestures, and
offensively touched several individuals. The California Supreme
Court stated that "[t]he ultimate standard for judicial conduct
must be conduct which constantly reaffirms fitness for the high re-
sponsibilities of judicial office. It is immaterial that the conduct
concerned was probably lawful, albeit unjudicial, or that petitioner
may have perceived his offensive and harassing conduct as low-
humored horseplay. '97
In a 1985 Michigan decision, In re Tschirhart,98 a Michigan
judge, while attending the National Judicial College in Reno, Ne-
vada, had a dispute with a cab driver, who had driven him to and
from the Mustang Ranch brothel. The controversy became a na-
tional media item and resulted in an ethics complaint in the judge's
home state of Michigan. Prostitution is legal in the Nevada com-
munity where the judge had been driven.
Judge Tschirhart was disciplined, but not for visiting a brothel.
Rather, he was disciplined for having made disparaging, disre-
spectful, and inappropriate statements in the media.99 The Michi-
gan Judicial Tenure Commission found that the judge's statements
constituted judicial misconduct in that the statements brought the
judicial office into disrepute and showed "callous disregard for the
necessity of avoiding the appearance of impropriety."' 10 One
member of the Michigan Commission wrote a concurring opinion
arguing that Judge Tschirhart's visit to a brothel, though legal in
Nevada, constituted misconduct.10
97. Id. at 281, 515 P.2d at 8, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 208. See generally Lubet, Beyond
Reproach, supra note 90.
98. 422 Mich. 1207, 1208, 371 N.W.2d 850, 851 (1985). See generally Shaman, Ir-
proper Social Activities of Judges, 7 JUD. CONDUCT RPTR. 1 (1985).
99. The judge's remarks included the following:
You bet I would do it again, under the same circumstances. I'm more con-
cerned about my principles than public reaction on an emotional basis about
something that doesn't even count. I will fight the charge that I defrauded the
Nevada taxi driver, even if it means generating publicity about my visit to a
legal brothel there. I enjoyed it. It was fun. There's nowhere like it in the
world. Although I am not in favor of legalized prostitution, the trade was han-
dled a lot better in Mustang Ranch than it was on East Michigan Avenue in
Lansing.
In re Tschirhart, 422 Mich. at 1208, 371 N.W.2d at 851 (citations omitted).
100. Id. at 1211, 371 N.W.2d at 853.
101. Id. In Judicial Ethics and Private Lives, the author made the following
observations:
While this author believes that private, consensual sexual conduct between
adults should not subject a judge (or anyone else) to discipline, the Code of
Judicial Conduct does appear to contain sufficient latitude to allow a contrary
conclusion, at least as a matter of statutory construction. This conclusion is
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If ethical violations should be made of lawful activities, they
probably shall be grounded in the language of the heading of Ca-
non 2. Canon 2 is entitled, "A Judge Should Avoid Impropriety
and the Appearance of Impropriety in All His Activities."10 2 Pri-
vate lawful sexual activities, however, would not violate the specific
language found in the body of Canon 2. Canon 2A provides, "A
judge should respect and comply with the law and should conduct
himself at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in
the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary." 103 The foregoing
seems to hinge on the legality of the act and the public perception
of the judge's integrity and impartiality. Unless the judge hears his
paramour's case as attorney, party, or witness, or is being
blackmailed, private activities rarely impact upon the judge's "in-
tegrity and impartiality." If the pliable phrase "appearance of im-
propriety" is the test, then such appearance of impropriety would
be extended beyond the legality of the conduct to moral values of
those who interpret the Code.
XI. POLITICAL ACTIVITIES
The central provision of Canon 7 on political activities is 7A(2),
which provides, "A judge may not, except when a candidate for
office or retention, participate in political campaigns or activities,
or make political contributions."" °  May a non-candidate judge
merely attend political events without being on the dias or other-
wise actively participating? Immediately after the passage of the
Code, the chairman of the Special Committee on the Administra-
tion of Justice in Cook County, contended that mere attendance
troublesome, since it seems to leave judges at the mercy of local social
conventions.
Lubet, Judicial Ethics, supra note 90, at 994. The author also offered the following
observations:
If philandering judges may be disciplined for impropriety, may the same rule be
applied to homosexual judges? May states require that unwed mothers or wo-
men who have chosen abortion to be removed from the bench? In each of these
examples the conduct involved is lawful, at least in a significant number of
states, or even constitutionally protected, but is still morally unacceptable to a
large number - perhaps even a majority - of citizens.
Id. (citations omitted).
Indeed, lawful sexual peccadillos essentially are private. The Illinois statutes on adul-
tery and fornication, which required open and notorious conduct, have been repealed.
The activities of fornication and abortion currently receive varying degrees of constitu-
tional protection. It is presently undecided in Illinois whether ethical violations turn on
whether the activity is lawful or unlawful.
102. ILL. S. CT. R. 62, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 62 (1987).
103. ILL. S. Cr. R. 62A, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 10A, para. 62A (1987).
104. ILL. S. CT. R. 67A(2), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I10A, para. 67A(2) (1987).
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was a proscribed "political activity."' °5 Receipt of a 4A letter"
from the Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board by a certain judge who
attended a women's political tea served to reinforce that posi-
tion.107 A simple remedy to the controversy, if one is desired, is to
add a provision to 7A(2) similar to that under Canon 5B(2) on
attendance of civic or charitable fundraising events which counsels
the judge that "he may attend such events."
As a non-candidate, a judge "should not engage in any other
political activity except on behalf of measures to improve the law,
the legal system, or the administration of justice."108 The latter
would seem to allow the judge to write his legislator about a pay
bill, or a bill to increase the number of judges, or to pass or not
pass a criminal statute. "[L]egislative proposals that might affect
the organization, structure, operation or administration of the judi-
cial branch of government," however, first must be submitted to a
subcommittee on legislation under the auspices of the Illinois Judi-
cial Conference's Executive Committee.Y°9 The subcommittee in
turn advises the Supreme Court, which has the ultimate adminis-
trative and supervisory authority of the Illinois judiciary. It would
also seem permissible for the judge to communicate to the county
board the judge's views about a new courthouse or a new jail, or to
105. Chicago Daily Law Bulletin, December 3, 1986, at 16, col. 5. Chairman Jerold
S. Solovy stated, "If a judge is popping up at Washington's parties or Vrdolyak's parties,
how is the public going to think they can render a fair decision." Id.
106. The following was explained by Judge Philip Benefiel, a member of the Judicial
Inquiry Board, when lecturing at the Illinois Judicial Conference at Chicago, Illinois on
September 3-5, 1987. A "4A letter" derives its name from Rule 4A of the Judicial In-
quiry Board. It is a request to the judge to come in and talk over a possible ethical
violation. Attendance is not mandatory, although no Illinois judge has declined the re-
quest to date. Such 4A letters do not contemplate proceedings before the Illinois Courts
Commission. None have to date, although there is no prohibition that a 4A letter might
later ripen into 4D letter. So far none has gone to the 4D stage. 4D reflects Rule 4D of
the Judicial Inquiry Board.
A 4D letter requires attendance before the Board and contemplates filing a formal
proceeding before the Illinois Courts Commission. A 4D letter is a prerequisite to such a
proceeding.
Approximately one half of the complaints received by the Judicial Inquiry Board are
disposed without 4A or 4D letters. Most of the balance are 4A matters. Approximately
two dozen ripen into Commission proceedings on an annual basis.
Court reporters take down all testimony at 4A and 4D proceedings. Untruthful testi-
mony can constitute a perjury charge before the Courts Commission.
107. A member of the audience at the Ethics lecture of the Illinois Judicial Confer-
ence stated that an associate judge from his circuit received a 4A letter from the Judicial
Inquiry Board regarding this activity.
108. ILL. S. CT. R. 67A(4), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 67A(4) (1987).
109. Advisory letter of January 25, 1988 to the Judges of Illinois from Mr. Samuel D.
Conti, Director, Administrative Office of the Illinois Courts.
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make comment to an Illinois Supreme Court Justice regarding the
appointment of a judge or the adoption of a court rule.
When may a judge begin his campaign for election? Under Ca-
non 7B(2), the judge may begin his campaign fund "90 days before
the filing of nominating petitions or an official declaration of inten-
tion to be retained in a judicial office ....*"11o The Code provides
nothing more specific as to when the campaign begins. As to when
it ends, the Code provides nothing more specific than Canon
7B(2)'s provision that campaign fund solicitation ends "no later
than 90 days after the last election in which he participates during
the election year."'I
When the judge is a candidate for election or retention, he has
diminished rights in expressing his opinions on controversial sub-
jects. Under Canon 7B(1)(c), the judge or judicial candidate
should not "announce his views on disputed legal or political is-
sues ... .112 Abortion and the death penalty seem to qualify
within that area. As a candidate, however, he may express "his
views on measures to improve the law, the legal system, or the
administration of justice, if, in doing so, he does not cast doubt on
his capacity to decide impartially any issue that may come before
him."' 13
It might be thought that once a judge is a candidate for election
or retention he may put on the full mantle of political campaigner.
Not so, under Canon 7B(l), a candidate for election or retention
"should maintain the dignity appropriate to judicial office."1 4 In a
Michigan disciplinary matter, 15 a judge, while a candidate for
election, criticized a legislative candidate in front of a high school
class and told the newspaper that he was stuffing envelopes and
making signs for the candidate's opponent. In disciplining the
judge, the Michigan Supreme Court found that the judge became
involved in "mudslinging," thus diminishing the public confidence
in the judiciary.' 16 The candidate judge, or non-judge running for
the bench, also should be careful when discussing his toughness or
sensitivity because of Canon 7B(1)(c). That canon warns that a
candidate "should not make pledges or promises of conduct in of-
fice other than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties
110. ILL. S. CT. R. 67B(2), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 67B(2) (1987).
111. Id.
112. ILL. S. CT. R. 67B(1)(c), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. IIOA, para. 67B(1)(c) (1987).
113. Id.
114. ILL. S. CT. R. 67B(l)(a), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 1OA, para. 67B(1)(a) (1987).
115. In re Bennet, 403 Mich. 178, 194, 267 N.W.2d 914, 920 (1978).
116. Id. at 195, 267 N.W.2d at 920.
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of the office .... 11117
XII. RIGHTS RESERVED TO THE JUDGE
A judge may serve by virtue of Canon 5D as a fiduciary for "the
estate, trust, or person of a member of his family," but "then only
if such service will not interfere with the proper performance of his
judicial duties.""" "Member of his family" includes a "person
with whom the judge maintains a close familial relationship.", 1 9
The judge should not serve as such a fiduciary if the proceedings
"would ordinarily come before him" or if the ward "becomes in-
volved in adversary proceedings in the court on which he serves or
one under its appellate jurisdiction."'' 20
Under Canon 4, a judge may "speak, write, lecture, teach, and
participate in other activities concerning the law, the legal system,
and the administration of justice."''2 ' He also may appear at public
hearings "on matters concerning the law, the legal system, and the
administration of justice .... Likewise, he may be a "member,
officer, or director of an organization or governmental agency de-
voted to the improvement of the law, the legal system, or the ad-
ministration of justice."'' 23 In all of these cases he may participate
only "if in doing so he does not cast doubt on his capacity to decide
impartially any issue that may come before him."'' 24 In a Florida
disciplinary matter, 2 a judge wrote letters to a local paper that
were critical of capital punishment. The Florida Supreme Court
found no misconduct, but found that the judge's comments came
"close of the dividing line."'' 26 The court put great weight on the
fact that the judge said he would follow the law notwithstanding
his strong view. 27
In a Minnesota case, 28 a judge was disciplined for criticizing the
attorney general for being "less than diligent" and being "politi-
117. ILL. S. CT. R. 67B(1)(c), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 67B(1)(c) (1987).
118. ILL. S. CT. R. 65D, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. IIA, para. 65D (1987).
119. Id.
120. ILL. S. CT. R. 65D(1), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 10A, para. 65D(1) (1987).
121. ILL. S. CT. R. 64A, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. IlOA, para. 64A (1987).
122. ILL. S. CT. R. 64B, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 64B (1987).
123. ILL. S. CT. R. 64C, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I1OA, para. 64C (1987).
124. ILL. S. CT. R. 64, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 10A, para. 64 (1987).
125. In re Inquiry Concerning A Judge, Gridley, 417 So. 2d 950, 954 (Fla. 1982). See
Lubet, Beyond Reproach, supra note 90, at 26.
126. 417 So. 2d at 954.
127. Id. at 955.
128. See Shaman and Reiter, Off-the Bench Speech, 8 JUD. CONDUCT RP'TR. 1, 1
(1986) (quoting In re Roberts, No. 51071 (Minn. Jan. 20, 1981)) [hereinafter Shaman and
Reiter].
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cally motivated" in certain controversial prosecutions. 29 The dis-
ciplinary authority also was concerned about the judge's comments
that he was forced to overturn the jury's verdict because of his
"Christian belief" that the defendant was not guilty.' 30 Lastly, the
disciplinary authority noted that the judge had told a reporter,
"[T]ell the people that I'm a strange person and sometimes I do
strange things."1 3'
Canon 5 deals with extrajudicial activities. The judge "may
write, lecture, teach, and speak on nonlegal subjects, and engage in
the arts, sports, and other social and recreational activities .... ,,32
The judge may participate in Canon 5A activities "if such avoca-
tional activities do not detract from the dignity of his office or in-
terfere with the performance of his judicial duties."'' 33 A recent
law review article points out, "[I]t is possible to say that the more
dignified, temperate, and measured off-the-bench speech is, the less
likely it will be found to be improper." 134
Canon 5 also provides that "[a] judge may participate in civic
and charitable activities that do not reflect adversely upon his im-
partiality or interfere with his performance of his judicial du-
ties."' 135 Nonetheless, if the extrajudicial activity provides a serious
conflict with his judicial duties, the judge may have to abstain from
any participation. Canon 5B states, "A judge should not serve if it
is likely that the organization will be engaged in proceedings that
would ordinarily come before him or will be regularly engaged in
adversary proceedings in any court."' 36 This seems to exclude a
judge's participation in a group such as "Mothers Against Drunk
Driving" when the judge regularly presides over drunk driving
cases. Likewise, it would seem to exclude a judge's participation in
a group seeking greater enforcement of sexual offense statutes
when the judge regularly hears sexual offense charges. The Com-
mittee Commentary singles out charitable hospitals and legal aid
agencies because of their increased likelihood to be involved in liti-
gation. The Committee Commentary to Canon 5B(l) also points
out that it is "necessary for a judge regularly to reexamine the ac-
129. Additionally, the judge dismissed a criminal charge against a defendant who had
been found guilty by a jury. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. ILL. S. CT. R. 65A, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I10A, para. 65A (1987).
133. Id.
134. Shaman and Reiter, supra note 128, at 3.
135. ILL. S. CT. R. 6513, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I IOA, para. 65B (1987).
136. ILL. S. CT. R. 65B(1), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I IOA, para. 65B(1) (1987).
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tivities of each organization with which he is affiliated to determine
if it is proper for him to continue his relationship with it.'1 37
Under Canon 5C, a judge may hold and manage investments
including real estate, but "should not assume an active role in the
management or serve as an officer, director, or employee of any
business." 138 This provision leaves undecided many issues about
what a judge may do in the running of the family farm. The family
farm certainly is an "investment, including real estate," but may
well take on dimensions of a business.
Canon 5C(3) states that, "A judge should manage his invest-
ments and other financial interests to minimize the number of cases
in which he is disqualified."1 39 If the judge's financial investment is
a frequent source of conflict, "he should divest himself . . ." of
it "[a]s soon as he can do so without serious financial
detriment ... ." 14
Under Canon 5G, a judge "should not accept appointment to a
governmental committee, commission, or other position that is
concerned with issues of fact or policy on matters other than the
improvement of the law, the legal system, or the administration of
justice."1 4 1 Therefore, he may not belong to the local library
board, to the mayor's commission to foster the performing arts, or
to an investigatory committee such as the Warren Commission.
He may not be Secretary of State while being a judge, as was Chief
Justice John Marshall, or Secretary for Foreign Affairs, as was
Chief Justice John Jay. Nor can he be the President's envoy to
France, as was Chief Justice Oliver Ellsworth. 42 The judge also
may not be an advisor to the executive branch, as were Justice
Louis Brandeis to President Woodrow Wilson, Justices Felix
Frankfurter and James Burnes to President Franklin D. Roosevelt,
Chief Justice Fred Vinson to President Harry Truman, and Justice
Abe Fortas to President Lyndon Johnson. 4 3 It also would be inap-
propriate for the judge to be a special prosecutor, as was Justice
137. ILL. S. CT. R. 65B(I), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 65B(1) committee com-
ments (Smith-Hurd 1987).
138. ILL. S. CT. R. 65C(2), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 10A, para. 65C(2) (1987),
139. ILL. S. CT. R. 65C(3), ILL. REV. STAT. ch, I 1OA, para. 65C(3) (1987).
140. Id.
141. ILL. S. CT. R. 65G, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I1OA, para. 65G (1987).
142. See McKay, The Judiciary and Nonjudicial Activities, 35 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 9 (1970). See also Appendix, Nonjudicial Activities of Justices of the Supreme
Court of the United States. A Selective Summary, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 27, 36
(1970).
143. Id.
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Robert Jackson at the Nuremberg Military Trials.'"
Under Canon 4C, the judge may assist an organization or gov-
ernmental agency devoted to improvement of the law, the legal sys-
tem, or the administration of justice in raising funds and may
participate in their management and investment, "but should not
personally participate in public fund-raising activities.1' 141 The
foregoing provision would seem to allow Illinois judges to partici-
pate on the State Pension Board for judges and the American Judi-
cature Society.
Canon 5 prohibits the judge from soliciting or allowing his name
to be used in any manner to solicit funds or other assistance for any
civic or charitable organization. A judge may not solicit funds for
a halfway house for criminal probationers, for a refuge for battered
women and their children, for a status offender agency devoted to
minors, or for a fundraising project for the local YMCA. Because
the canon prohibits the judge from soliciting in any manner for
funds or other assistance, it probably is improper that a judge call a
local merchant and ask him to donate a bed to the local refuge for
battered women and their children. Arguably, it also would be im-
proper for a judge to collect money at pancake breakfast for the
Brownies or for the high school athletic fund. It also might be
improper for the judge to pass the plate at church services. Cur-
rently, Canon 5B(2) does not embody any de minimis rule.
Whether a de minimis rule applies is open to debate.
Canon 5B(2) specifically provides that a judge should not allow
his name to be used on the letterhead of any civic or charitable
organization if the stationery is used to solicit funds.'" Although
the ABA Code specifically allows a judge's name to appear on the
letterhead of a charitable or civic organization, the Illinois Code
does not.
The judge has the further obligation under Canon 5B(2) to see to
it that "his staff, court officials and others subject to his direction
or control" not solicit "on his behalf for any purpose, charitable or
otherwise."'14  Consequently, the judge's bailiff, clerk, and court
reporter may not sell tickets to the judge's civic or charitable or-
ganization's pancake breakfast.
Although under Canon 5C(4)(a) a judge may accept a gift inci-
dent to a public testimonial for him, under Canon 5B(2), the judge
144. Id.
145. ILL. S. CT. R. 64C, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. IIOA, para. 64C (1987).
146. ILL. S. Cr. R. 65B(2), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 65B(2) (1987).
147. Id.
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may not "be a speaker or the guest of honor at an organization's
fund-raising events, but he may attend such events."'' 48 Conse-
quently, a judge may not accept the Jurist of the Year Award at
the YWCA's fundraising dinner, although he may accept it an an-
other YWCA event that is not a fundraiser.
XIII. CONCLUSION
In a law review article written eighteen years ago, former Justice
Tom Clark stated, "Illinois has adopted the most stringent set of
canons and rules of any of the states." 49 He also observed, "[T]he
judges do not renounce their citizenship.., when they take on the
robes, and I submit that they should continue to take an active part
in public affairs."'1 0 Now a new Code has been adopted after cer-
tain Greylord judges were convicted and sentenced to the peniten-
tiary. Judges throughout Illinois are trying to abide by the
requirements of the Code and to maintain their rights as citizens.
Terminology in the Code makes it difficult to know when one's
ethical obligations are fulfilled, and when one's rights of citizenship
begin.
The specter of the "appearance of impropriety" does not assist
the judge in determining whether his conduct is ethical. When he
exercises a right to speak, write, or participate, he often is troubled
that his conduct may "cast doubt on his impartiality." He is per-
mitted to participate in civic and charitable activities, but knows he
may not engage in the main activity of such affairs, namely
fundraising.
The judge perhaps should recoil from handling money at his
charity's pancake breakfast since the Code prohibits solicitation.
There may be someone who believes the judge's collecting two dol-
lar tickets is a subterfuge for a bribe or that someone is currying
the judge's favor. The Code also requires the judge to re-examine
whether he should belong to the organization in question.
The Code prompts the judge to examine his contacts with attor-
neys who practice before him lest critics charge him with ex parte
communications and accepting prohibited gifts. The Code causes
the judge to scrutinize whether he can trade buying lunches with
an attorney for fear the activity might be viewed as more than "or-
dinary social hospitality." The judge must not appear too much of
148. Id.
149. Clark, Judicial Self-Regulation-Its Potential, 35 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS.
37, 38 (1970).
150. Id. at 37.
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a friend of a lawyer, if he may acknowledge being one at all. One
wonders too if the judge's writing a letter of recommendation for a
lawyer's child will one day be scrutinized as an ethical violation
requiring discipline.
The Code compels the judge to give serious thought to what he
can or cannot do as a non-candidate and candidate. The non-can-
didate currently must strive toward non-political purity. The can-
didate must be on guard that he not appear too political even when
he is competing in the political arena.
The judge is aware that times have changed and require him to
be ever considerate of public perceptions of his conduct. Unfortu-
nately, the process breaks down when the judge misgauges how the
public perceives his conduct. This may be especially true when the
judge's extrajudicial contacts with the public are few.
It is hoped that judges need not restrict their dining and social-
izing to fellow judges and their families. The judge should con-
tinue to be an active and visible member of the community and
"not become isolated from the society in which he lives." 15' Per-
haps in being an active member of the community, the judge will
keep in touch with community values and be better equipped to
rule on conflicts that arise in the real world.
151. Committee Commentary to Canon 5A reads: "Complete separation of a judge
from extrajudicial activities is neither possible nor wise; he should not become isolated
from the society in which he lives." ILL. S. CT. R. 65A, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para.
65A committee comments (Smith-Hurd 1987).
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